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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifteen years, the Rehnquist Court has sought to satisfy the politically
moderate majority of Americans by engaging in a pragmatic and results-orientated “split-thedifference” jurisprudence when deciding difficult constitutional questions.1 This approach, while
*

Associate, Lowenstein Sandler P.C.; J.D. with High Honors, Rutgers University School of Law
– Camden.
1
The term “split-the-difference” jurisprudence originates from a recently published Stanford
Law Review article written by Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Rehnquist Court at
Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1969
(2006). Although this article makes use the phrase “split-the-difference” and the general
principle encompassing it, this article is distinct in that it focuses exclusively on split-thedifference jurisprudence as it applies to substantive due process doctrine. In this respect, it not
only illustrates the historical source of split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence,
1

seductive for its temperance and customary “evenhandedness,”2 can no longer serve as the basis
for constitutional decisionmaking. As illustrated by recent substantive due process case law, the
Supreme Court has unjustifiably expanded judicial authority at the expense of legitimately
exercised democratic judgment. Under the leadership of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the
Supreme Court must return to a process-orientated approach to constitutional law.
The early years of the Rehnquist Court were often characterized as a period of
“revivalism.”3 Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to restore a democratic balance in government by
“reinvigorating … the authority of individual states to exercise their residual police powers”
because he “seemed intent on recognizing the American Constitution as a document with
enforceable structural features that would bolster this country’s enjoyment of democratic
liberties and, ultimately, of personal rights.”4 However, due to the Chief Justice’s “ebbing
influence and stamina” and a “growing faith in the powers of judicial wisdom,” this legacy began
to shift. Rather than promoting a limited institutional role, the latter years of the Rehnquist Court
became increasingly synonymous with “judicial supremacy.”5

The source of this dramatic

transformation was, in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.6 Her refusal to adopt a universal
jurisprudence in favor of judicial pragmatism and her willingness to exploit a strategic position
as the “swing vote”7 led to a “split-the-difference” jurisprudence, which greatly increased
judicial discretion.

it also suggests doctrinal solutions, which extend well-beyond the intended purpose of Judge
Wilkinson originally published article.
2
Id. at 1971.
3
Id. at 1970.
4
Id. at 1970.
5
Id. at 1969.
6
Id. at 1972.
7
See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (describing how Justice O’Connor strategically deprived Chief
2

Split-the-difference jurisprudence materializes in two basic forms: result and reasoning.
The Supreme Court splits-the-difference in result when “actual holdings straddle both sides of a
difficult issue, and the outcomes, while perhaps unsatisfying to the adversaries in a polarized
debate, nevertheless attempt to settle upon a constitutional middle ground.”8 The most recent
and perhaps glaring example of this occurred during the last term of the Rehnquist Court. In
both Van Order v. Perry9 and McCreary County v. ACLU,10 the Court was confronted with the
public display of the Ten Commandments on government property. In the former case, the
monument was donated to the state of Texas in 1961 by a civic fraternal organization and placed
with other commemorative and historical markers and memorials.11 In the latter case, copies of
the Ten Commandments were posted in the hallways of two Kentucky courthouses.12 Despite
the similarity of these facts, the Supreme Court found by a 5-4 margin Van Order's Ten
Commandments display constitutional, but affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring removal
of McCreary County's display. This result avoided a divisive and emotional Establishment
Clause issue by attempting to secure a sensible, albeit ultimately unsatisfying solution, which
avoided a universal constitutional pronouncement, grounded in the text, history and structure of
the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court splits-the-difference in its reasoning when it adopts a legal standard,
which is based on compromise rather than an intellectually consistent doctrine. In Vieth v.
Jubelirer,13 the Court considered the constitutionality of state legislatures’ practice of politically
Justice Rehnquist of a majority opinion in a pivotal abortion case by adopting a new
constitutional standard after realizing that her vote would be decisive).
8
Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 1972.
9
Van Order v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
10
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
11
Van Order, 125 S. Ct. at 2858.
12
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. 2728.
13
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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gerrymandering congressional districts. In the view of Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the issue was
absolute: all political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because there is no “judicially
manageable criteria for adjudicating them.”14 By contrast, Stephen G. Breyer believed that the
Court should adjudicate political gerrymandering claims and set forth a fact-intensive balancing
test to determine when a political party’s power becomes too “entrenched.”15 Splitting-thedifference between these two outermost positions was Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, because, by
his measure, political gerrymandering claims should not be foreclosed per se.16 He appreciated
the lack of neutral principles, which could present constitutional guidance, but nevertheless
declined to take a definitive position given the importance of voting rights.17 Instead, absent
meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court, he encouraged lower courts to develop standards
for adjudicating such claims.18 Consequently, he expanded the scope of judicial discretion and
inappropriately reserved a measure of institutional authority.

In contrast to the traditional

standards of constitutional adjudication, Justice Kennedy simply made a decision with “an eye
toward a middle ground.”19
Although Justice O’Connor has since retired from the Court, and she, along with her
colleague, Chief Justice Rehnquist have been replaced with “conservative” appointees Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. and John G. Roberts, Jr., respectively, the temptation to implement a split-thedifference jurisprudence remains ever-present. As many observers have pointed out, Justice
Kennedy has taken the place of Justice O’Connor as the Court’s swing vote, and “deliberately

14

Id. at 281.
Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16
Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17
Id. at 309-10.
18
Id.
19
Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 1980.
15
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and craftily” well-positioned himself as a “necessary but distinctive vote for a majority.”20 Thus,
Justice Kennedy, by some accounts, now stands “alone in deciding the outcomes in the most
divisive cases.”21 Yet, as Professor Douglas W. Kmiec notes, the appointment of Chief Justice
Roberts may transform constitutional doctrine and stem the tide of difference-splitting
jurisprudence. In his first term as Chief Justice, Roberts has crafted an impressive measure of
consensus and unanimity through his advocacy, pleasant demeanor and intellectual brilliance.22
If the Chief Justice maintains this newborn influence, it could “overwhelm [Justice] Kennedy’s
ability to deploy his swing vote” and provide the Supreme Court with a decisive opportunity to
remake substantive due process while simultaneously finding common ground among strongly
competing judicial philosophies.
For the reasons provided herein, the Chief Justice must succeed in creating an intellectual
environment suitable for adopting consistent, rules-based substantive due process doctrine that
builds upon the uniformity enjoyed during the Roberts Court’s first term. Beginning with a brief
historical outline, this article will discuss the source of split-the-difference substantive due
process jurisprudence by illustrating conflicting approaches made famous by Justices Hugo L.
Black and John Marshall Harlan. Then, by charting the approaches of selected current Supreme
Court justices, it will shed light on modern difference-splitting substantive due process
20

Dahlia Lithwick, Swing Time, SLATE (January 17, 2006), at www.slate.com/id/2134421/ (last
visited August 7, 2006).
21
David G. Savage, Déjà vu Once Again, ABA JOURNAL 13 (September 2006).
22
Douglas W. Kmiec, Who Really Rules the Supreme Court?, Los Angeles Times (July 8, 2006),
available
at
www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oekmiec8jul08,0,1887126.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions (last visited August 8, 2006)
(Chief Justice Roberts “has a conservative mind but a diplomat’s nature”); Dahlia Lithwick,
Charm Offensive, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (August 1, 2006), available at
www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?id=1153991132514 (last visited August 1,
2006); see, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2005) (unanimous opinion on contentious First Amendment issue implicating associational
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jurisprudence.23 Finally, this article will suggest doctrinal mechanisms that will allow Chief
Justice Roberts to eliminate split-the-difference jurisprudence and return the Supreme Court to
its role as a limited, but nevertheless equally important, institutional authority.24
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process “is widely viewed as the most problematic category in
constitutional law”25 and it has long been the subject of tremendous controversy from the period
of the so-called Lochner Era to the contentious decisions of Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas.
speech). But see, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. ___ (2006) (divisive 5-4 decision on the
continued applicability of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule).
23
Kmiec, supra note 22, available at www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oekmiec8jul08,0,1887126.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions (last visited August 8, 2006)
(commenting that the four-vote liberal block lead by Justice John Paul Stevens is deadlocked
with the rock-solid conservatives led by Justice Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas); see
generally Laurence H. Tribe, Treatise Power, 8 Green Bag 2d 291, 292 (2005) (letter to
Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer stating that constitutional law “could go in any of several
directions”).
24
“The case for split-the-difference jurisprudence is not an insubstantial one.” Wilkinson, supra
note 1, at 1981. Split-the-difference leads to moderation, which “is a trait that the public admires
in the judiciary” and it “permits the Court to stay above the fray and to assume a statemanlike
pose.” Id. at 1981-82. But at the same token, split-the-difference jurisprudence also leads to an
unwarranted increase is judicial authority, which infringes too greatly on the Congress, the
executive and the States. As Justice Scalia noted in Vieth,
"The judicial Power" created by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution is not
whatever judges choose to do, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982); cf. Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332333 (1999), or even whatever Congress chooses to assign them, see Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-577 (1992); Chicago & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110-114 (1948). It is the power to
act in the manner traditional for English and American courts. One of the most
obvious limitations imposed by that requirement is that judicial action must be
governed by standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can
be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.
Id. at 278. The purpose of this article, therefore, is too explain the source of split-the-difference
substantive due process jurisprudence and suggest doctrinal mechanisms for overcoming the
temptation to implement it.
25
Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 314 (1993).
6

The doctrine originates from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which provide that neither the federal government nor the
states, respectively, shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.”26 The early history of the Due Process Clause dates back to 1215 and the signing of
Magna Carta, a document, which bound the King of England to guarantee certain procedural
rights to all free men: “No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or
exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by the
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”27 Although the drafters of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments replaced the phrase “law of the land” with “due process of law,” they
did not remake or expand upon the intent of the Magna Carta.28 Instead, substantive protection
under the Due Process Clause evolved as a matter of judicial interpretation and the Supreme
Court’s increasing desire to supplement constitutional protections, which evaporated as a result
of the Slaughter House Cases’ “liquidation”29 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
A. The Lochner Era

26

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment offers identical protection, which is
applicable to the federal government.
27
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (citing 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1225)) (Black, J., dissenting).
28
Id. (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. 272, 276 (1856) (“the
words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the
words ‘by the law of the land’ in the Magna Carta”)).
29
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Revising the
Slaughter House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1996); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760
n. 6 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
7

The theory that the Due Process Clause contained substantive protections only became
“serious”30 in the late 1890’s. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,31 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute, which prohibited persons from contracting with marine
insurance companies that had not complied with state law.32 The trial court entered a judgment
in favor of defendants, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.33 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Louisiana’s regulation of the contracts at issue violated the
Due Process Clause’s protection of “liberty.”34 In dictum, the Court reasoned that the Due
Process Clause embraces a right of citizens “to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be
free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; [and] to pursue any livelihood or avocation . . . .”35
Following Allgeyer, the Supreme Court elaborated on its broad mandate of freedom to
enjoy “all faculties”36 in a case, which would eventually serve to infamously identify this time
period of laissez faire jurisprudence.37 In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court in a five-four
decision declared unconstitutional a New York statute that set maximum hours for bakers at 10
hours per day or 60 hours per week.38 Closely scrutinizing the legislation, the Supreme Court
reasoned that it was “an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of
the individual to . . . enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him

30

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (noting that substantive due process has existed since
at least Mugler v. Kanasas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887)) (joint opinion).
31
Allgeyer v. Lousisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
32
Id. at 593.
33
Id. at 584-89.
34
Id. at 589.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
38
Id. at 52.
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appropriate or necessary.”39 Freedom of contract, the Court believed, is the general rule and
restraint is the exception.40 In dissent, the first Justice John Marshall Harlan acknowledged the
mandate prescribed in Allgeyer, but conceded that economic liberty is still subject to regulations,
which may sometimes prohibit certain business practices.41

Charting a line of cases “so

numerous that further citations are unnecessary,”42 he concluded that the regulation in question
should properly be considered a lawful police power of New York State.43 Writing separately,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. added that the Court’s current conception of “liberty” in the
Fourteenth Amendment is “perverted when it is held to prevent” a regulation enacted through
democratic means “unless it can be said that … the statute … would infringe [on] fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”44
As any first year constitutional law student can attest, by 1937 the Supreme Court’s
Lochner Era protectionist mindset evaporated and the focus on economic liberty diminished.45
Despite a strong willingness to question democratically enacted legislation and invalidate it as an
arbitrary restraint on economic “liberty,” the Supreme Court's jurisprudence eventually succumb
to outside pressures such as the Great Depression and shifted to adopt the deferential approach
articulated in Lochner’s dissent.46 Substantive due process, “the earlier constitutional principle

39

Id. at 56.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
41
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65-66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42
Id. at 67.
43
See id. at 72 (stating that New York’s rationale for enacting the legislation “ought to be the
end of th[e] case”).
44
Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45
See West Cost Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (signaling the demise of
Lochner).
46
Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62.
40
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that states have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs,”47 was no longer supportable.
B. Justice John M. Harlan and the Second Coming of Substantive Due Process
Subsequent to Lochner’s demise, substantive due process was thought to be a dead
letter.48 But with the liberalization of constitutional doctrine in the 1960’s, which included an
endorsement of a so-called “living Constitution”49 from the Warren Court, substantive due
process was remade into a mechanism in which to question the reasonableness of social, rather
than economic, legislation. This constitutional rebirth became a convenient tool for invalidating
statutes thought to intrude too prominently on the individual and personal decisions of American
citizens. As a result, state and federal legislation that infringes on deeply personal issues such as
a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy;50 a married couple’s ability to use birth
control;51 an extended family’s decision to live as one unit;52 or a patient’s right to refuse
medical treatment,53 are treated as suspect and afforded a higher level of judicial review. If a
State seeks to regulate such issues, it is ordinarily required to first demonstrate that there exists a
compelling governmental interest.

47

Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 862 (citing ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
85 (1941)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (stating that substantive
due process was thought to be put to “rest once and for all”) (Black, J., dissenting).
49
See e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51
Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Conneticuct, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
52
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
53
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-89 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48
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The intellectual source of the second coming of substantive due process owes itself to the
second Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ulman.54 In Poe, the plaintiffs were
doctors and patients challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use
of contraceptive devices.55 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that the statutes
were applicable to married couples even under a claim that contraception would pose a serious
threat to the health of a married woman.56 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that
the mere existence of the challenged statute did not afford standing to the plaintiffs.57 The State
had not prosecuted anyone for violating the statute and the plaintiffs were in no danger of
immediately sustaining any injury to its enforcement.58
In dissent, Justice Harlan moved beyond the question of justiciability and addressed the
merits of the plaintiffs’ challenge, which he concluded, violated the Due Process Clause’s
guarantee against “arbitrary impositions … of purposeless restraints.”59 To arrive at this holding,
Justice Harlan began his analysis with commentary on the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment.60 Anticipating objections from his colleagues who would dispute any
substantive component to the Due Process Clause, he acknowledged that its historical source, the
Magna Carta, contemplated procedural safeguards “against executive usurpation and tyranny.”61
Nevertheless, in a cursory and somewhat convenient fashion, he concluded that the history of the
54

See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Poe serves as a “major opinion leading to the modern doctrine”); id. at 765 (engaging
in an analysis of unenumerated rights “in the wake of Poe”); see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 539
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (conceding that his approach to substantive due process does not find a
basis in the “explicit language of the Constitution” or “in any decision” of the Supreme Court’s
prior case law).
55
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958).
56
Poe, 367 U.S. at 498.
57
Id. at 508-09.
58
Id. at 501.
59
Id. at 543.
60
Id. at 540-42.
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Fourteenth Amendment “shed[] little light”62 on the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Therefore, as an original matter, the Due Process Clause was not necessarily confined to
procedural guarantees.63

Buttressing this conclusion, Justice Harlan offered a pragmatic

explanation for recognizing substantive due process rights. The protection of procedural rights,
but the denial of substantive rights would “fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of
life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the future could,
given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the
enjoyment of all three.”64 Stated another way, even where procedural rights were protected to
the greatest extent possible, the denial of substantive rights would eventually lead to destruction
of any entitlement to life, liberty or property.
Even assuming Justice Harlan’s reading of the Due Process Clause is correct, there
remains the considerable challenge of developing a methodology for determining what
substantive protections are afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of procedural
rights under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has appropriately engaged in a
balancing of interests.65

After all, the word “due” is not an absolute prescription, but a

recognition that a safeguard must be afforded in proportion to the life, liberty or property at
stake.66 Taken further, the Supreme Court has distilled procedural due process to notice and an
opportunity to be heard.67 In the case of substantive due process, Justice Harlan advocated for a

61

Id. at 540.
Id. at 541 (citing Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2
Stan. L. Rev. 15).
63
See id. at 540-42.
64
Id.
65
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
66
See id.
67
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 57980 (1975).
62
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similar balancing of interests because he believed that such rights could not be “reduced to any
formula” or “determined by reference to any code.”68
Despite an amorphous balancing of competing interests, Justice Harlan did not believe
that “judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them;”69 or, stated in
modern jargon, “legislate from the bench.” On the contrary, judges can strike the proper balance
of interests by “having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which … [this
country] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.”70 Moreover, judges can
exercise “limited and sharply restrained judgment” and engage in the common law tradition of
making a decision on novel claims by closely following “well-accepted principles and criteria.”71
Quoting the Court’s language in Rochin v. California,72 Justice Harlan repeated that the “vague
contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large” because they cannot merely
draw on “personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial
function.”73
While reason and restraint are well-accepted mechanisms for limiting judicial discretion,
Justice Harlan’s reliance on “living” tradition74 as a guidepost is decidedly more problematic and
has led in no small part to the Supreme Court’s current crisis of consistency.75 In Poe, Justice
Harlan’s application of “living” tradition provided him with justification for reaching a benign
68

Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 542.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 544.
72
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
73
Id. at 170-71.
74
Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
75
See John F. Basiak, Jr., Dangerous Predictions: Referencing “Emerging” History and
Tradition in an Era of Blue State Federalism, 15 Widener L. J. 135, 136-37 (2005) (concluding
that the utilization of “emerging” during a rise in Blue State Federalism creates a “dangerously
predictive methodology” that “invites lower federal courts to seek constitutional guidance from
recent social trends supported by powerful progressive states”).
69
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and comfortable result: the invalidation of an “uncommonly silly”76 and “asinine”77
contraception statute. From a common sense perspective, the government’s interest in regulating
a married couple’s access to contraception seems minimal; thus, the decision, at first blush,
appears correct.

Yet, despite this pragmatic conclusion, the appeal of Poe’s extravagant

language and the deep reverence and respect many have for its author,78 not all justices or legal
scholars appreciate its historical or deductive justifications.
C. Justice Hugo L. Black and the Total Incorporation Doctrine
Among Justice Harlan’s colleagues, the most influential79 and vocal critic was Justice
Hugo L. Black, who on “many occasions … express[ed] … [a] strong belief that there is no
constitutional support whatsoever” for the doctrine of substantive due process.80 Such assured
opposition stemmed from three related premises: (1) the text and history of the Due Process
Clause demonstrate that it guarantees procedural, not substantive rights;81 (2) substantive due
process is a mechanism for Supreme Court justices to interject their own predilections and
determine what they believe to be “fair” rather than what is a genuine constitutional right;82 and
76

See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id.
78
GEOFFREY R. STONE, THE FIRST AMENDMENT lxiii (Aspen 2nd ed. 2003); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, THE NEW REPUBLIC (August 1, 2005), available at
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050801&s=sunstein080105 (calling Justice Harlan a “great
conservative voice” on the Warren Court).
79
See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1221, 1222 (2002)
(stating that “Justice Black ranks as one of the greatest constitutional jurists of the last century, a
first-ballot hall-of-famer”); id. at 1247-48 (concluding that Justice Black was the intellectual
leader of the Warren Court).
80
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-76 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
81
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co.,
18 How. 272, 276 (1856) (“the words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to
convey the same meaning as the words ‘by the law of the land’ in the Magna Carta”)).
82
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510 (conceding a personal preference, but nonetheless deciding the
case in accordance with the text of the Constitution) (Black, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963). Of course, the temptation to rely upon fairness as a guidepost in
interpretation persists to this day. As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook frustratingly noted in United
77
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(3) substantive due process doctrine allows for a method of interpretation that effectively amends
the Constitution without utilizing the deliberative amendment process because it ignores the
Supreme Court’s duty to place itself “as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who
framed the instrument.”83 To the first criticism, there is little doubt that Justice Black is correct.
Even those who support substantive due process acknowledge this limitation;84 and, as many
commentators have observed, “substantive due process is not just an error, but a contradiction in
terms.85 The Supreme Court has, in a sense, left readers of its “substantive due process cases …
to feel like a moviegoer who arrived late and missed a crucial bit of exposition. Where is the
part that explains the connection between this doctrine and the text of the constitutional
provisions from which it takes its name?”86 To the second and third criticisms, however, the
States v. Logan, “[l]aws are not ‘harsh’ or ‘pointless’ in any value-free framework; they seem
harsh or pointless by reference to a given judge’s beliefs about how things ought to work, which
is why a claim of power to revise ‘harsh’ or ‘pointless’ laws elevates the judicial over the
legislative branch and must be resisted.” Slip Opinion at 9 (7th Cir. July 6, 2006).
83
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debate will endlessly continue.

Since Chief Justice John Marshall’s landmark opinion in

Marbury v. Madison87 establishing the doctrine of judicial review, the Supreme Court has
struggled to draw a line between interpretation and alteration. While conservative jurists would
argue that discovery of unenumerated fundamental rights is an unwarranted expansion of judicial
authority, liberal-minded jurists see such measures as a fulfillment of their constitutional
obligations.88 As Justice David H. Souter once pronounced, using words first made famous by
Chief Justice John Marshall, “it is a constitution we are expounding.”89
In addition to a forceful critique of Justice Harlan’s view of substantive due process,
Justice Black offered “eccentric”90 support for his own affirmative theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment: total incorporation. Under this doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to the states.91 Thus,
following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, state as well as federal laws would be
invalidated as violative of the Constitution if they infringed on the substantive guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. However, those rights not explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights could not
later be discovered in open-ended constitutional clauses such as the Ninth Amendment or the
Due Process Clause.92
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Justice Black’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment “was the product of years of
study …, reading and rereading primary and secondary sources that his fellow Justices had
ignored or slighted.”93 This research culminated in his dissent in Adamson v. California, where
he made three notable findings: the Fourteenth Amendment was designed (1) to make the Bill of
Rights (the first eight Amendments) binding upon the States; (2) to give validity to the Civil
Rights Bill; and (3) to declare who were citizens of the United States.94 An illustrative and
famous example95 of total incorporation can be found in the dissent of Griswold v. Connecticut.96
In Griswold, the Supreme Court was again confronted with C.G.S.A. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958),
the Connecticut statute that made it illegal to provide “information, instruction, and medical
advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception.”97 Unlike its decision in
Poe, a majority of the Court reached the merits of the case and held that it was “repulsive” to the
Constitution.98 Writing for the majority, Justice William O. Douglas reasoned that the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments have “penumbras,” which create a “zone of
privacy” that protected the conduct at issue.99 Concurring in the result, Justice Harlan reaffirmed
his belief that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism to question the
arbitrariness of the legislation and protect “basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’”100 In dissent, Justice Black placed aside his personal feelings regarding the statute’s
fairness and deemed it constitutional: “I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am
93
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nevertheless compelled to admit that government has the right to invade it unless prohibited by
some specific constitutional provision.”101 He then sharply criticized Justice Harlan’s “natural
law” approach, and in an instructive footnote, discounted any notion that the discretion of judges
could be limited by spelling out superficial “catchwords and catch phrases.”102

In Justice

Black’s view, phrases such as “shock the conscience,”103 or “fundamental notions of fairness,”104
“inherent,”105 “fundamental”106 or “essential”107 sound “impressive,” but they “are all that … lie
behind [a] decision” based on personal preferences.108
D. In the Wake of Justices Harlan and Black: “Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence”
Despite offering a significant critique of Justice Harlan’s natural law approach and a
persuasive (albeit simplistic)109 argument in support of total incorporation doctrine, Justice Black
never garnered a majority opinion in support of his position.110 The Burger and Rehnquist
Courts sought to limit both the number of unenumerated rights and method utilized to discover
them, but neither adopted an absolutist, textualist view of the Bill of Rights.111 On the contrary,
when the substantive due process issue, abortion, finally re-crystallized before the Supreme
Court in the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, recent Republican appointees David H.
Souter and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in a joint opinion, which
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rejected principle in favor of a politically compromising and pragmatic approach.112 Thus, rather
than clarifying substantive due process doctrine, the intellectual struggle between Justices Black
and Harlan created a convoluted doctrine113 increasingly contingent upon respective
appointments to the Supreme Court.114 The constitutional environment, in other words, became
ripe for the development of split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence.
In Casey, the petitioners were abortion clinics and a class of physicians who brought suit
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from a Pennsylvania statute, which made it illegal for a
physician to perform an abortion on a married woman who fails to provide certain documentary
proof of spousal notification.115 The district court held that all provisions of the statute were
unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction, but the United States Court of Appeals for
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the Third Circuit, with then-Judge Alito dissenting, affirmed in part and reversed in part. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Casey’s “elaborate” analysis of stare decisis116 served to justify the preservation of the
“central holding of Roe,”117 but it nevertheless offered an intriguing historical dialogue on the
source of substantive due process. Interestingly, the joint opinion began by acknowledging that
the “most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are those
recognized by the Bill of Rights” and conceding that a temptation exists, as a means of curbing
“discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights
already guaranteed … by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution.”118 However, the joint
opinion reaffirmed that the Supreme Court has “never accepted that view.” On the contrary, it
cited to a number of circumstances in which arbitrary state legislation was correctly invalidated
as violative of a substantive, fundamental right despite finding no source in the text of the
Constitution.119 According to the joint opinion, the Bill of Rights does not “mark[] the outer
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”120
The joint opinion firmly rejected the principles set forth by Justice Black in Adamson, but
it fell short of the eloquent and well-expressed approach of Justice Harlan in Poe. While it cited
Poe with liberality, it did not generate the certainty and stability associated with a sound
common law conclusion. Instead, the joint opinion reaffirmed Roe’s collection of isolated cases
of a “deep, personal character,”121 and prematurely concluded, reminiscent of Allgeyer, that “the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
116
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and of the mystery of human life.”122 This deduction did not “pay respect to detail, seeking to
understand old principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples.”123 By most
accounts, a reading of those cases does not clearly endorse “an all-encompassing ‘right to
privacy.’”124
Casey’s “ultimately cryptic”125 holding represented a squandered opportunity to clarify
substantive due process doctrine and it marked the beginning of the Rehnquist Court’s split-thedifference jurisprudence. Rather than acknowledging the superior pedigree of Justice Black’s
total incorporation doctrine and thus approach fundamental rights in an all-or-nothing manner, or
at minimum, faithfully adopting the calculated and cautious (albeit flawed) balancing test of
Justice Harlan, the Supreme Court, in a “sadly ironic” reduced “certainty and predictability”126
by attempting to split-the-difference in reasoning (not to mention split-the-difference in the
national political debate), by adopting the now infamous “undue burden” standard for abortion
regulations.127

Following Casey, abortion was still considered in some respects to be a

“fundamental right,” but it was capable of regulation repugnant to other recognized rights such
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as freedom of expression or free exercise of religion. This result momentarily quelled outrage on
both sides of the political debate while simultaneously satisfying neither.128
In the years following Casey, the justices escalating and much observed willingness to
write separately (sometimes to express disagreement with reasoning that would otherwise appear
minor), resulted in constitutional law “becoming an aggregation of nine idiosyncratic theories
and nine bodies of personal precedent [][t]o a degree that would have shocked the
Founders….”129 As a result of this declining consensus on the Court, the attraction of split-thedifference jurisprudence further increased. Now, with Justice Kennedy firmly situated as the
Supreme Court’s swing vote, a major challenge to the Roberts Court will be to find common
ground among strongly competing judicial philosophies.
III. THE ROBERTS COURT
A. Justice Antonin G. Scalia
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Recent scholarship has suggested that close parallels can be drawn between the
jurisprudence of Justice Black and Justice Scalia.130 While this scholarship has, perhaps, raised
the interesting premise that a staunch supporter of President Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation131
and a socially and religiously conservative Republican132 can share similar judicial philosophies,
it does not translate well into a discussion of substantive due process doctrine. Although both
justices share a strong preference for textualism and originalism, Justice Black took a more
principled approach to the recognition of unenumerated fundamental rights. As evident from his
dissent in Griswold, Justice Black never split-the-difference in reasoning or conceded to Justice
Harlan and his fluid mechanism for invalidating social regulation.
Justice Scalia is known for rabble-rousing comments on the legitimacy of substantive due
process,133 but he is not an absolutist.134 On the contrary, since his controversial plurality
opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia has settled into a position, which substantially
restricts, but does not abolish, substantive rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. In
Michael H., a man whose blood tests indicated there was a 98.07% probability of paternity
challenged a California statute that presumed that a child born to a married woman living with
her husband is a child of the marriage.135 The mother of the child lived with another man who
130
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was presumed to be the father under the statute. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice
Scalia engaged in a two pronged analysis to determine whether the statute violated the plaintiff’s
substantive due process rights. First, Justice Scalia framed the issue in narrow terms: “whether
the relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as a
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it
has been accorded special protection.”136 Second, Justice Scalia engaged in a historical analysis
to determine whether the plaintiff’s liberty interest, as defined by Justice Scalia, has been
traditionally protected at common law.137 Given the exceedingly narrow level of generality used
to frame the issue, the Court concluded that the interests at hand did not warrant protection as a
fundamental right, and therefore, were subject to “the ordinary ‘rational relationship’ test.”138
Fundamentally, Justice Scalia’s justification for implementing his methodology is to
avoid arbitrary decisionmaking139 and limit the discretion of judges so as to conform to, as he
views it, the designed role of the judiciary.140 Quoting a famous dissent of Justice Byron R.
White, he stated:
That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights
should not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this Court,
is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judgemade constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present construction of the
Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on
the anticipation of the Framers . . ., the Court should be extremely reluctant to
136
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breathe still further substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike
down legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its welfare. Whenever the
Judiciary does so, it unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part of the
governance of the country without express constitutional authority.141
In light of these warnings, Justice Scalia devised his two-pronged analysis. By narrowly framing
the issue, a significant avenue of judicial manipulation and results oriented jurisprudence was
eliminated. No longer could judges devise their own question-begging level of generality for
framing the issue, which would inevitably result in the desired outcome.142 Moreover, by
grounding the discovery of substantive due process rights in history and tradition, there was little
danger that this undemocratic process would proceed too quickly.143
To Justice Scalia’s critics, the difficulties with this methodology are obvious. Sharply
dissenting in Michael H., Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. disagreed with the decision to utilize a
narrow level of generality in framing the issue or to rely upon history and tradition
unrepentantly. Rather than disputing the dangers of arbitrary decisionmaking, Justice Brennan
warned his colleagues not to be “seduc[ed]” by Justice Scalia’s claims of objectivity because
what traditions are “deeply rooted” is “arguable;”144 and cautioned against the danger of defining
the scope of liberty so narrow that it would “[t]ransform[] the protection afforded by the Due
Process Clause into a redundancy [that] mocks those who, with care and purpose, wrote the
Fourteenth Amendment.”145 While these criticisms did little to impact the jurisprudence of
Justice Scalia, they have, in conjunction with the writings of Justice Harlan, served as a powerful
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influence on those members of the Court seeking to split-the-difference between the conservative
reasoning of Justice Scalia and a more liberal reading of the Due Process Clause.
B. Justice David M. Souter
Justice Souter’s approach to substantive due process can be aptly characterized as
antagonistic to Justice Scalia’s. Instead of heading warnings over unfettered judicial discretion
and the unwarranted expansion of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Souter has
sought to liberalize the doctrine by instituting an approach, which mimics in part Justice Harlan’s
in Poe v. Ulman.146 Justice Souter regards Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe as the modern source
of the second coming of substantive due process,147 and distinguishes himself in only respect.
While Justice Harlan appeared to present his dissent in Poe as an approach that applied equally
in force to both executive and legislative action, Justice Souter believes that the “criteria to
identify what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
governmental officer.”148
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a highspeed police chase sued alleging deprivation of their son’s substantive due process right to
life.149

The District Court granted summary judgment,

150

but the Ninth Circuit reversed,

reasoning that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the police officers were
deliberate indifferent in pursuing the deceased and the driver of the motorcycle.151 The Supreme
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Court granted certiorari to address the Ninth Circuit’s “deliberate indifference” standard and
resolve the conflict between the Circuits over the standard of culpability required to find a
violation of substantive due process in the context of a police pursuit.152 Writing for a majority
of the Court, Justice Souter determined that the police officers’ conduct did not constitutionally
“shock the conscience.”153 A higher degree of culpability was required because liability in
circumstances such as this must turn on the good faith effort of the police officers.154
The centerpiece of Justice Souter’s executive action-substantive due process doctrine is
Rochin v. California and its invocation of the “shocks the conscience” standard. By its very
terms, the test connotes a significant level of discretion and flexibility, which is designed to
protect against executive action that is perceived to be arbitrary under the circumstances. As
Justice Souter noted, substantive due process
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other
specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a
matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of
facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other
circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.155
Thus, by way of example, a police chase that results in the death of a suspect, such as in Lewis,
may not shock the conscious, but the egregious and unnecessary forced pumping of a suspect’s
stomach to recover evidence of drug possession would satisfy the standard.156
Justice Souter recognizes the significant limitations of the shock-the-conscience
standard,157 but nevertheless invokes it in the context of executive action in the belief that its
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flexibility will prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming a “font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States[.]”158 By
avoiding any duplication of traditional common-law fault, greater care is made to avoid liability
simply because a person is “cloaked with state authority.”159 Or, as Justice Souter explained,
“executive action challenges raise a particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of
constitutional claims.”160 Consequently, by Justice Souter’s measure, substantive due process
protection will only be afforded when state actors engage in behavior that is so egregious that it
“violates the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’”161
Despite Justice Souter willingness establish a high burden under the pretext of a “shocksthe-conscience” standard, Justice Scalia denounced Lewis’ fluid and imprecise methodology as
well as its legislative-executive distinction. As to its methodology, Justice Scalia first pointed
out that it is an apparent departure from the recent precedent, Washington v. Glucksberg, a case
that adopted a derivative of the two-pronged test set forth in the plurality opinion in Michael
H.:162
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whether the right had been “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’”
and (2) a “careful description” of the asserted right. 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citation omitted). This
two-pronged approach mirrors the method adopted by Justice Scalia in Michael H., with the
exception of the specificity required to frame the issue. See generally Basiak, supra note 74, at
418-418 n.109.
In other words, Michael H., by all appearances, features a narrower level of generality used to
characterize the potential fundamental right.
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Today’s opinion gives the lie to those cynics who claim that changes in this
Court’s jurisprudence are attributable to changes in the Court’s membership. It
proves that the changes are attributable to nothing but the passage of time (not
much time, at that), plus application of the ancient maxim, “That was then, is
now.”163
But more importantly, Justice Scalia also brashly questioned how courts could determine
whether executive action shocked the conscience: “Adhering to our decision in Glucksberg,
rather than ask whether the police conduct here at issue shocks my unelected conscious, I would
ask whether our Nation has traditionally protected the right respondents assert.”164 His concern,
as made evident from previous substantive due process cases, was how courts could appropriate
limit themselves to their designed constitutional role: “In allocating such risks, the people of
California and their elected representatives may vote their consciences.

But for judges to

overrule that democratically adopted policy judgment on the ground that it shocks their
consciences is not judicial review but judicial governance.”165

Although Justice Scalia’s

reasoning failed command a majority in Lewis, these concerns did not fall silent on Chief Justice
Rehnquist or, more importantly, Justice Kennedy. In words that would eventually prove ironic,
by Justice Kennedy’s assessment, the “shocks-the-conscience” test carries with it an “unfortunate
connotation” because it is “standard laden with subjective assessments;”166 it splits-thedifference in reasoning by failing to adopt an approach capable of universal application. Thus,
according to Justice Kennedy, it should be viewed “with considerable skepticism.”167
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Id. at 865 (emphasis in original).
166
Id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167
Id. This skepticism has proved to be warranted because many lower courts have had
difficulty in interpreting Lewis’ shock-the-conscience standard. Robert Chesney, Old Wine or
New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and
Executive Action, 50 Syracuse L. Rev. 981, 1000 (2000) (citing Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829,
836 (7th Cir. 1999); Singleton v. Cicil, 176 F.3d 419, 425 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Payne v.
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C. Justice Clarence Thomas
Although Justice Scalia is often credited with being the Supreme Court’s recognized
conservative, Justice Clarence Thomas has quietly distinguished himself from his more wellknown colleague with a “profound and far-reaching jurisprudence.”168 Unlike Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who eventually succumb to the seductive qualities of split-the-difference
jurisprudence, or Justice Scalia, who, just recently and surprisingly accepted an expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause,169 Justice Thomas has
rejected any evolution in his constitutional jurisprudence. His exceedingly conservative (some
would even say “bizarre”) positions make him a unique and often the sole dissenter on the
Court,170 but they also demonstrate that Justice Thomas is arguably the most process-oriented,
intellectually consistent justice. Many members of the Supreme Court, past and present, have
compromised doctrine in favor of results-oriented, split-the-difference jurisprudence. Justice
Thomas has compromised little since joining the Court and, like Justice Black before him,
appears willing to defend doctrine over any result.171
Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998); Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d
504, 529 (10th Cir. 1998); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1998)).
168
John C. Eastman, Taking Justice Thomas Seriously, 2 Green Bag 2d 425, 426 (1999).
“Thomas’ ‘classical liberal’ originalism differs in significant respects from Borkean conservative
originalism often attributed to Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia (not
to mention Robert Bork himself). It is a jurisprudence … that seeks to uncover (and recover) the
original principles rather than merely the original practice of the Founders. And it is a
jurisprudence rooted in the self-evident truths of human nature and the inalienable rights derived
from that nature, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence.” Id.
169
See Raich v. Ashcroft,
170
Eastman, supra note 168, at 426; see also TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 86 (stating that Justice
Thomas will more often “los[e] a Court” because of strong opinions, which draw sharp lines).
171
See United States v. New York Times, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (stating that “every
moment’s continuance” of the injunctions against newspapers, which were poised to divulge
classified intelligence, amounted to a “flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First
Amendment”) (Black, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting any balancing approach to the First Amendment under
the belief that the men who drafted the Bill of Rights “did all the ‘balancing’ that was to be done
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Given Justice Thomas’ uncompromising approach, it is no surprise that he has not
authored a single seminal substantive due process case since his tenure on the Court. After all,
far too commonly, decisions on substantive due process, and especially enumerated fundamental
rights, are the product of negotiation and political posturing. One need only look to the joint
opinion in Casey and its so-called undue burden test to reach this conclusion. As Justice Thomas
noted in Stenberg v. Carhart, the “Casey joint opinion was constructed by its authors out of
whole cloth. The standard is a product of its authors’ own philosophical views about abortion,
and it should go without saying that it has no origins in or relationship to the Constitution and is,
consequently, as illegitimate as the standard it purported to replace.”172 Since Casey, Justice
Thomas has continued to plainly and concisely refute majority positions on substantive due
process and offer intriguing insight into his desire to shift substantive due process into a
framework that may serve as a more appropriate historical basis for unenumerated fundamental
rights.
The simplicity of Justice Thomas’ approach to constitutional law is exemplified in the
dissent of Lawrence v. Texas.173 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court reversed Texas criminal court
rulings affirming the convictions of two men for “deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex.”174 Writing for a six-three majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy
overturned the defendants’ convictions by determining that the term “liberty” under the Due
in this field”); Gerhardt, at 26. Justice Thomas’ most controversial opinion in this regard is no
doubt Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), where he argued in dissent that prisoners beaten
by guards have no cause of action under the Eight Amendment because the conduct, while
tortious, did not constitute “punishment” for the purposes of the “cruel and unusual punishment”
clause. Id. at 17-30.
172
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 982 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
174
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as
“any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “presumes an autonomy of the self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”175 The Texas criminal
statute could not withstand scrutiny because the conduct at issue “involve[d] liberty of the person
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”176 In dissent, Justice Thomas recognized
the majority’s frustration with Texas’ misguided and ill-advised attempts to legislate harmless,
private and consensual adult, sexual activity, but disagreed with their decision overstep their
limited judicial function and question the wisdom of the legislation. Invoking the words of
Justice Stewart in Griswold, he acknowledged that legislation punishing a person for his
expressing his sexual preference through harmless, consensual sexual conduct was
“uncommonly silly.”177 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas explained in a manner reminiscent of
Justice Black, that, as a member of the Supreme Court, he was “not empowered to help [the]
petitioners” because his “duty … is to ‘decide cases agreeable to the Constitution and laws of the
United States.’”178 A “general right of privacy,” or as the Court termed it in Lawrence, “the
‘liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions,” could not be found
by Justice Thomas in the Constitution.179
Despite a firm rejection of the doctrine of substantive due process and Justice Kennedy’s
broad and imprecise language, Justice Thomas has not discounted the possibility that
unenumerated fundamental rights can be discovered from the text of the Constitution. Some
well-known originalists such as Judge Robert H. Bork reject enumerated rights outright and read
person; or … the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.” Id. at
§ 21.01(1).
175
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting))
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (some internal quotations omitted).
179
Id.
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open-ended clauses of the Constitution to be superfluous,180 but Justice Thomas has never taken
such an affirmative stance. Instead, he has indicated a clear preference for making any such
determinations within the framework of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which, as noted,
has been effectively read out of the Constitution as a result of the Slaughter House Cases.
In Troxel v. Granville, grandparents petitioned the Washington Superior Court for the
right to visit their grandchildren. After the grandchildren’s motion opposed any visitation, the
Washington Superior Court entered a visitation order. When the Washington Supreme Court
reversed the visitation order, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. A
plurality of the Court determined that a Washington statute granting grandparents certain
visitation rights violated the mother’s substantive due process right to child-rearing. Concurring
in the judgment, Justice Thomas expressed no opinion on the substantive due process issue or
whether the Due Process Clause’s original understanding included unenumerated fundamental
rights.181 However, intriguingly, in a footnote he also stated that the case did not involve a
challenge to the Washington statute based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Therefore,
the opportunity to “reevaluate the meaning of that Clause” remained available for a future
case.182
Justice Thomas’ eagerness to reevaluate the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is motivated by his belief that the Clause’s demise has led “in no small part to the current
disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.”183 Only when substantive due process is
abolished can the Court, according to Justice Thomas, determine whether unenumerated rights,
180

Judge Bork famously referred to the Ninth Amendment as an “inkblot,” because its meaning
is irretrievable due to its indefinite language. See Randy Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for
Today’s Constitution, 26 Valparaiso Un. L. Rev. 419, 419 (1991) (citing Judge Bork’s
confirmation hearing before the Senate).
181
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80.
182
Id. at 80 n. 1 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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such as “the right to privacy,” can be discovered in the Constitution. It is clear, however, that
even with the rebirth of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice Thomas would not
introduce “yet another convenient tool for invention new rights, limited solely by the
‘predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.’”184 Thus, even if
the Court were to ground unenumerated rights in the Privileges and Immunities Clause rather
than the Due Process Clause, it is unlikely that Justice Thomas would recognized the legitimacy
of Roe and its privacy-based progeny, or split-the-difference in result by recognizing their
precedential force.
D. Justice Stephen G. Breyer
In 2005, Justice Stephen G. Breyer published a book entitled Active Liberty: Interpreting
Our Democratic Constitution.185 It was a monumental occasion in the legal world because it is
rare that a sitting Supreme Court justice presents a formal account of his jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, despite its promise as a long-awaited liberal response to originalism, and its
potential to offer the first detailed presentation of “non-originalism” jurisprudence,186 Active
Liberty does not, in the words of Judge Bork, “qualify as a major intellectual event.”187 Rather
than offering a formal, unifying method for constitutional and statutory interpretation, Justice
Breyer, as typical with other non-originalists, merely offers counterarguments to originalism and
presents ad-hoc rationales for difficult, divisive cases. While he acknowledges the benefits of a
183

Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502
(1977)).
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STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (Alfred
A. Knopf 2005).
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Active Liberty was intended to refute the arguments raised by Justice Scalia in his book A
Matter of Interpretation. Nina Totenburg, Justice Breyer: The Case Against "Originalists",
National
Public
Radio
(September
29,
2005),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4930456 (last visited August 27, 2006).
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Bork, supra note 128, at www.newcriterion.com/archives/24/02/enforcing-mood/.
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judge’s customary methods for interpretation, i.e. language, history, tradition, precedent, purpose
and consequences, he conveniently abstains from any fixed labels.188
Despite Justice Breyer’s failure to provide a unifying theory that would bind the judiciary
to their designed institutional role, Active Liberty is unique in one respect: it expounds a
“theme.” To Justice Breyer, judges should interpret the Constitution in a manner that promotes
“a government in which all citizens share and participate in the creation of public policy.189
What this means, however, despite a “balanced and dispassionate tone,”190 is that Justice Breyer
promotes a radical idea: judges should maintain the freedom to utilize balancing tests in all areas
of constitutional law (not just in areas that textually justify balancing, i.e., the Fourth
Amendment or procedural due process), that fail provide lower courts with guiding principles or
remove the perception that the constitution is interpreted in light of a judge’s personal
predilections.
The most striking example of Active Liberty’s shortcomings occurred in the 2004-2005
Supreme Court term. As noted in both Van Order v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU, the
Court was confronted with the public display of the Ten Commandments on government
property. Despite the similarity of these facts, Justice Breyer alone found a constitutional
distinction between the cases. In justifying this result, Justice Breyer emphasized that "no single
mechanical formula"191 or universal jurisprudence could "substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment."192 Rather than limiting his institutional role by seeking cautious, but consistent
guidance from a universal approach to interpreting the Constitution, Justice Breyer reserved the
188

See BREYER, supra note 185, at 117.
Id. at 15-16.
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Kathleen M. Sullivan, Consent of the Governed, NEW YORK TIMES (February 5, 2006), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/books/review/05sullivan.html?ex=1154145600&en=6025b
1efcd0c4289&ei=5070 (last visited July 27, 2006).
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right to merely bind himself to his notion of active liberty and find unconstitutional a display,
which, in his opinion, limits a religious minorities and non-Christians from participating in
democratic government. Not surprisingly, this decision dumbfounded many legal commentators
and was questioned by those seeking guidance and clarity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
which had unfortunately become convoluted and overly complex.
Given the flexibility of active liberty and its capability of expounding result-splitting
jurisprudence, it is surprising that Justice Breyer has had few opportunities to express views on
substantive due process doctrine.193 Nevertheless, based on past practices, it can be predicted
with little difficulty how Justice Breyer will vote in future cases.194 The more interesting issue is
the apparent contradiction between support for substantive due process and active liberty.
Substantive due process, by definition, is antidemocratic because it ascends certain rights beyond
the review of the political majority. Active liberty, by contrast, requires interpretation of the
Constitution in a manner that promotes democratic participation. If, by example, Justice Breyer
continues to uphold the undue burden standard and preserve a weakened right to abortion, he will
be removing the most politically divisive and emotionally charged issue in American politics
from the political debate and forbidding citizens from participating in a democratic discussion on
how best to reconcile their differences. How can these two principles be reconciled? According
to Justice Breyer, a component to consider within the concept of active liberty is the concern for
“dramatic legal change.”195 Thus, when abortion is the issue, Justice Breyer preserves the undue
burden standard under the pretense that he can maneuver the competing interests so as to create
the least controversial or destabilizing effect.
192
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Nor does Justice Breyer address substantive due process in Active Liberty.
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In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) Justice Breyer invalidated an abortion regulation
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standard, the expansion of judicial authority, nor the lack of jurisprudential guidance to lower
courts is of major concern.196
Criticism of Active Liberty is not to say that the promotion of citizens’ democratic
participation in government is not an important goal – it is. The difficulty with Active Liberty is
that it seeks to accomplish its goal through “interpretation” of the Constitution, which by most
accounts, must be done within the designed framework of the Constitution. Regardless of the
importance of active liberty or its apprehension for dramatic legal change, the judiciary cannot
simply rewrite or update constitutional principles for the modern, pragmatic world when it must
remain confined to a much more narrow institutional function. Therefore, in the event Justice
Breyer explicitly elaborates on active liberty in a future substantive due process case, it is likely
the justices will write separately seeking to avoid broad pronouncements on the increased role
for the Supreme Court in promoting democratic participation in government. His differencesplitting results, however, will continue to gain favor unless a more attractive, minimalist
approach can be promoted.
E. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
Criticizing Justice Kennedy for his split-the-difference jurisprudence is, unfortunately,
nothing new. As Supreme Court commentator Dahlia Lithwick recently observed, “Kennedy’s
inability to find certain, easy answers and his tendency to hold grandiose hopes for the law are
fodder for his detractors. This is the Kennedy of Casey, and Lawrence, and Rapanos, and it’s the
Kennedy that plows up fields of constitutional law and sows of confusion and inscrutable
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grandeur in their place.”197 Given the monumental responsibility imputed on Justice Kennedy as
a result of his transformation as the Court’s “swing vote,” it is important to scrutinize his
decisions and evaluate whether his reasoning is fundamentally based upon the text, structure and
history of the Constitution. Although some attacks on him are regrettably personal or verbose in
nature (James Dobson famously called him “the most dangerous man in America”),198 much of
the legal and academic commentary is appropriate.
In the area of substantive due process doctrine, Justice Kennedy’s most recognized
pronouncement occurred in Lawrence. As noted, Lawrence involved a challenge to a Texas
criminal sodomy statute,199 which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision.200
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy utilized dramatic language designed to broadly
characterize the liberty interest at stake and emphasize individual dignity and autonomy.201 The
197

Dahlia Lithwick, No Man is an Island, SLATE (August 7, 2006), at
www.slate.com/id/2147247/ (last visited August 7, 2006).
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Id.
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Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as
“any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person; or … the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.” Id. at
§ 21.01(1).
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Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
201
While many commentators have harshly criticized Justice Kennedy’s usage of expansive and
indeterminate language, others have commended him for reading the Due Process Clause as if it
should not be read in isolation. According to Professor Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence
is a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far from having separate
missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal
double helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly
universal dignity. This tale centers on a quest for genuine self-government of
groups small and large, from the most intimate to the most impersonal.
Lawrence H. Tribe, The Fundamental Right that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev.
1893, 1898 (2004). If in fact Professor Tribe is correct in his assessment of Lawrence, then
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence could be compared favorably with the process-orientated
approach to due process first articulated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938), the most famous footnote in constitutional law; and it also be likened to
the approach articulated in John Hart Ely’s monumental work, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review. However, Justice Kennedy’s failure to provide a suitable
methodology for selecting the appropriate level of generality would remain problematic.
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question presented to the Court therefore was whether a constitutionally recognized “liberty of
the person in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions” requires the invalidation of a Texas
statute “making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct.”202 Drawing on cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe and Casey, he rejected the
claim that the Court should focus its analysis narrowly as it had done in a previous sodomy case,
Bowers v. Hardwick:203
“The issue presented is whether Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.”
That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate
the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.204
Next, Justice Kennedy discounted the usefulness of established history and tradition in
constitutional decisionmaking:
In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of
most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex. “[H]istory and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.”205
Based on Justice Kennedy’s broad characterization of the liberty interest at stake, and his
decision to emphasize “emerging” history and tradition, the Court concluded that the Due
Process Clause protected the conduct at issue.
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While many legal commentators commend the Court’s decision in Lawrence because it
corresponded with their own personal political sympathies,206 and it protected a “discrete and
insular minority,”207 those commentators fail to appreciate how Justice Kennedy’s split-thedifference reasoning inappropriately expands the institutional role of the judiciary. First, Justice
Kennedy’s characterization of the issue before the Court was composed too broadly and without
suitable explanation. No justification for the level of generality is offered (other than to state that
Bowers’ level of generality was too narrow) and no methodology is provided to formulate a
consistent level of generality for future substantive due process cases. Thus, if so inclined,
judges are left to decide in a case by case fashion what level of generality is best suited to reach a
results-orientated conclusion. This ad-hoc approach permits “judges [to] improperly expand
their role in government, infringe upon the responsibilities of political actors and violate the
principle of separation of powers.”208 As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook has suggested, “[i]nstead
of assuming power and then searching for a level of abstraction, the court should search for that
degree of generality capable of justifying a judicial role.”209

Second, and perhaps more

importantly, Justice Kennedy’s treatment of history and tradition leaves open the possibility that
judges may constitutionalize conduct when there exists an “emerging awareness” that states are
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engaging in certain social “experiments.”210 Rather than allowing states to exercise their police
powers and modify or repeal laws dealing with the regulation of the health, safety and welfare of
their citizens, the judiciary will be empowered with the ability to amend the constitution when a
political trend can be recognized as social progress, and usurp the legitimate democratic will of
the people and the “progressive life-cycle of acceptance” that occurs in American politics
through federalism.211 But as Justice Scalia noted in dissent, “[c]onstitutional entitlements do
not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on
certain behavior.”212 “[T]he Constitution was not created to react to the immediacies of the
shifting political will of a yet unqualified number of jurisdictions.”213

Consequently, this

difference-splitting reasoning should not be embraced under the guise of tolerance, moderation
or social temperance. Lawrence’s motives are admirable, but its method is badly chosen.214
210

Describing social legislation as state “experimentation” finds its source in Justice Louis D.
Brandeis’ Lochner Era dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) whereby
he stated that it was “one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” Id. at 311.
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See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46
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Beyond substantive due process doctrine, Justice Kennedy has also split-the-difference in
significant criminal procedure and environmental law cases. In Roper, Justice Kennedy
recognized that an emerging awareness existed, which condemned the usage of the death penalty
for individuals convicted of a crime under the age of 18. Thus, state statutes permitting such
penalties are now considered to be cruel and unusual and violative of the Eighth Amendment. In
Booker v. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), Justice Kennedy casts the decided fifth vote in a case,
which refused to extend the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce doctrine. However, he
denied Justice Scalia a majority by concurring and limiting any further restriction of the
exclusionary rule. Finally, in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006), the Court was
asked to decide the scope of authority granted to the Army Corp of Engineers to regulate
wetlands as “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act. Justice Kennedy similarly denied
Justice Scalia by adopting a case-by-case approach, which unsatisfactorily held to a “significant
nexus” standard.
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F. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
The Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
predictably focused on substantive due process, especially the right to obtain an abortion.215
Senators concerned with the continued erosion of such rights repeatedly questioned the nominees
on their respective opinions of Roe and posed hypothetical questions designed to elaborate on
cryptic and uninformative opening statements.216

Particularly in the case of Chief Justice

Roberts, the reaction to these difficult and sometimes combative proceedings was masterful.
Although his opinion on a number of important constitutional issues remained unknown, the
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Chief Justice Roberts opened the confirmation hearings by proclaiming that he had no
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including the role of precedent, history or text in constitutional interpretation.
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Senate became preoccupied with his self-promoted modesty and was content to confirm him
with largely bi-partisan support.217
Since joining the Court, Chief Justice Roberts has lived up to the considerable
expectations of conservatives and largely debunked the cynical perspective of liberals. Rather
than presenting a “bold and ideological”218 approach like Justices Scalia and Thomas by seeking
reevaluate precedents he believes to be wrongly decided,219 Chief Justice Roberts’ has mimicked
his judicial hero and former mentor, Henry J. Friendly, a famous and well-respected U.S. Court
of Appeals Judge for the Second Circuit,220 by taking careful measure of existing case law before
encroaching on new legal theories.221 As noted by Professor Douglas Kmiec, “Roberts has a
conservative mind but a diplomat’s nature. His abiding concern is to keep the court within
bounds on legal, rather than ideological, grounds.”222 Thus, his “collegial, consensus-building”
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approach “has the capacity to draw votes from both sides on controversial and pedestrian cases
alike.”223
The earliest and perhaps most poignant example of the Chief Justice’s “consensusbuilding” occurred in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, a contentious
case, which pitted the associational and free speech rights of law schools against the military and
spending powers of Congress. Various law schools challenged a statute that denied federal
funding to those institutions, which had denied equal access to military recruiters on campus
based on the military’s treatment of homosexuals.224 The District Court denied an application
for a preliminary injunction, but the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the statute was an
unconstitutional condition on the law schools.225 The Supreme Court reversed.226 Remarkably,
despite the controversial political issues raised by the case, Chief Justice Roberts crafted a
narrow, but intellectually sound ruling that drew unanimous approval from the other justices.
Rather than clumsily applying compelled speech case law, he correctly recognized that such
doctrine was “plainly incidental” because “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom
223

Id.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1302. The Solomon Amendment denied federal funding to an
institution,
if the Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any subelement of
that institution) has a policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that
either prohibits, or in effect prevents-- (1) the Secretary of a military department
or Secretary of Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to
students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military
recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to
campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer; or (2) access by
military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting to the following information
pertaining to students (who are 17 years of age or older) enrolled at that institution
(or any subelement of that institution): (A) Names, addresses, and telephone
listings. (B) Date and place of birth, levels of education, academic majors, degrees
received, and the most recent educational institution enrolled in by the student.
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of speech or press to [regulate] … a course of conduct….”227 This result avoided the temptation
to convolute doctrine and it preserved a clearly demarcated speech/conduct distinction, implying
that speech rather than conduct would retain its standing as the most rigorously guarded
constitutional right.228 Consequently, neither the Court’s liberals nor its conservatives quarreled
with reasoning or result.
In the context of substantive due process doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts has thus far
succeeded in applying his minimalist, consensus-building approach.

In Ayotte v. Planned

Parenthood of Northern New England,229 the Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of
a New Hampshire abortion law, which failed to provide for a health exception for the mother.
Reasoning that the law explicitly violated the undue burden standard set forth in Casey, the
District Court entered a preliminary injunction and the First Circuit affirmed. Rather than
unnecessarily and prematurely revisiting abortion precedents (given the infancy of his tenure as
Chief Justice), at oral argument in November 2005, Chief Justice Roberts indicated at oral
argument that the case could be decided narrowly based on the issue of remedy.230 Writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court (incidentally, for the first time ever in an abortion case) Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the District Court could have entered an injunction narrower in scope.
Therefore, the case was remanded.
Admittedly, despite Chief Justice Roberts’ first term successes, it important not to
overstate the significance of the Court’s newfound consensus. As evident from the holding of
Ayotte, the Roberts Court has yet to squarely address the issue of abortion, and when it does, the
Chief Justice will need more than his cautious, minimalist approach and celebrated intellect to
227
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obtain a clear majority. The moderate and evenhanded approaches of Justice Breyer and Justice
Kennedy (despite his extravagant language) undoubtedly hold tremendous appeal and they will
continue to serve as a tempting solution for decisions that create political divisiveness. Avoiding
split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence in future cases will therefore require
additional, well-settled doctrinal components.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
If split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence is to be marginalized and
uniformity in reasoning sustained, the Roberts Court will have to, at minimum, remain faithful to
two recent developments. First, the Supreme Court must continue its extension of the Graham
doctrine. Under Graham, substantive due process claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
cannot succeed where a more “explicit textual source of constitutional protection” exists.231
Thus, for example, when a constitutional claim is brought as a result of a law enforcement
officer’s excessive force, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’ must be the guide . . .
. .”232 At minimum, a faithful adherence to this principle will substantially limit the availability
of substantive due process claims and avoid opportunity to craft compromised-minded solutions.
It may even slowly return the Court to the “jot-for-jot” approach of Justice Black.233
The second, and perhaps more revolutionary, way in which the Roberts Court can limit
split-the-difference jurisprudence is through the revitalization of the Privileges and Immunities
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Clause. Even though the Slaughter House Cases liquidated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as a source of unenumerated fundamental rights, recent interest from both the Court’s
liberals and conservatives brings intriguing possibility of new life.234 If this development were
to persist, less reliance would be placed on the Due Process Clause. While the dormancy of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause leaves the Court with little constitutional guidance for its
decisions,235 it would nevertheless create greater legitimacy for the discovery (or subsequent
demise) of unenumerated fundamental rights and diminish the significant expansion of
institutional authority afforded to the Supreme Court.236 This increased legitimacy may create a
greater consensus among the Court’s most sharply divided justices and reduce the temptation to
split-the-difference in reasoning or result.
V. CONCLUSION
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton famously assured the People of the State of New
York that “the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to
234
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the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them.”237 Thus, as the weakest of the three departments of power,”238 the judiciary, it could
“truly be said,” would have “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment[.]”239 Yet, despite
Hamilton’s pledge, in the wake of the intellectual struggle between Justices Black and Harlan
and aided by the jurisprudential pragmatism of Justice O’Connor, a split-the-difference
substantive due process jurisprudence has developed, which inappropriately expands the
Supreme Court’s judicial discretion. Under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme
Court has a unique opportunity to restore its institutional role. Rather than “interpreting” the
Constitution in a manner that purports to promote participation in democracy or preempting
democratic judgment through judicial intervention aimed at political moderation, Chief Justice
Roberts can and must apply the principles of judicial modesty and intellectual consistency that he
routinely expressed during his confirmation hearing, and account for the authority of the
Congress, the executive and the States.
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